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THE IMPACT OF EU OVERSIGHT ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE GERMAN 
AUTO INDUSTRY 
Jason Gorn 
INTRODUCTION 
As the Europea n Union (E.o.) marks its 50th anniversary, its efforts to create a single 
European free market continue to face a number of obstacles. A key business poli cy concern 
among E.o. m ember states and corporati ons is the E .o. policy directi ve that aims to 
£lCilitate corporate takeovers in the interest of E uropean corpora te effi ciency in the global 
market place. As the E uropean Unio n stru ggles to establish economic regulatory command 
through measures such as its directive on takeover bids, m ember nations and corporations 
come under pressure to adhere to E. U. prescribed E uropean practices rather than following 
only their own perceived national and corporate self-interest. Germ any, in particular, 
provides a special challenge to E. 0. oversight as the result of an ongoing debate on 
international corporate governance policies . A number of German laws and business 
practices conflict with E. U . poli cies. German corporations rely o n concentrated corporate 
ownership and control to protect corporate stability. Alterations to German policies and 
corporate governance structu res that protect German corporate ownership are a threat to 
Germany's control over its industries, opening the door to hostile takeovers of German 
corporations. Such policy alterati ons, advocated by the E.o. , test the resiliency of the E. U. 
and Germany's con111utment to the E. U. 
Germany's strongest and m ost protected industry, the autom obile industry, provides 
the best example of the challenges that face the German co rpora te system under E .U. 
governance. T he current debate over Porsche's bid to control Volkswagen has opened a 
"Pandora 's box of governance issues." I German state and corporate policies have long been 
geared toward protecting the German autom obile industry from perceived disruptive forces, 
parti cularly corporate takeovers that might result in foreign ow nership or m aj or 
consolidations of German corporations with a loss of German j obs. This analysis explo res 
the issues facing the German auto industry, and the matter of corporate takeovers in 
particular, while assessing the impact of E. U . oversight on the German auto industry and the 
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German corporatist state. This assessment reveals inherent resistance by Germany and o ther 
E . U. member states toward E. U. policies that facilitate corporate takeovers and describes a 
number of corporate governance policies and government laws that continue to thwart 
takeovers in the German auto industry. Tlus resistance has, for the tin'le being, effectively 
derailed the current E.U . directive aimed at LlCilitating corporate takeovers. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GERMAN AUTO INDUSTRY 
T he German automotive industry is the key industry in the German economy. " It is 
o f erninent significance for growth and prosperity of Germany as a business locatio n. It is 
indispensable . .. for guaranteeing a high level of income and for safeguarding a high 
ernployment volume." (Becker, 217) M ore than a third of all vehicle production in the E. U. 
is in Germany. T he German auto companies worldwide production amounts to 23% of total 
world passenger car production and the German car brands possess a 47% market share in 
Western Europe. About 20% of the annual German gross domestic product in the last 
decade was earned by the auto industry The auto industry produced a German foreign trade 
surplus in cars of 79 billion euros in 2004, which amounts to 80% of the entire German 
trade surplus. The industry directl y employs approximately 770,000 Germans, with an 
estimated 1.5 million m ore employed in the multitude of industries and services upstream 
and downstream from autom otive production (e.g. mechalucal engineering, chenucals, etc.), 
not counting those in car sales and trades such as repair and service, etc, which add another 
3 million jobs. It is estimated that one in seven German jobs depend on the auto industry. 
T he German auto industry, understandably, has been referred to as the "engine of the 
German Economy." (Becker, 21 8-19) 
THE IMPORTANCE OF CORPORATE-STATE RELATIONS IN THE GERMAN AUTO INDUSTRY 
Germany is a federal state made up of different states or "lands." Many aspects of social 
and econonuc life are decentralized in Germany and are the responsibility of these state 
governments. The m ajo r German automotive corporations are Volkswagen, BMW, 
DaimlerC hrysler, Porsche, O pel, and Ford Werke. Each manufacturer has its headquarters in 
a ditIerent state, with the exception of Porsche and D aimlerC hrysler, which share Stuttgart 
in the state of Baden- Wtirttemberg as the site of their headquarters. The autom otive 
companies that m ake up the German automotive industry have strong regional ties to the 
German states in w hich they were established and in which they maintain their 
headquarters. Each of the German car companies, therefore, must deal with its own regional 
government, as well as the national German government. Because of these strong regional 
ties, each company can rely on its own state govermnent to help represent its interests at the 
national level as well . (Dankbaar, 2) The econonues of these states are centered on their m ain 
industry, with each of these automakers typically being thc m aj or cmploycr, dircctly and 
indirectly, in their respective regions. This is particularly true for Volkswagen, which 
transformed Wolfsburg in the state of Lower Saxony into one of the largest auto production 
sites in the world Volkswagen is the only major employer in the region (Dankbaar, 1), which 
m akes the workforce in the state of Lower Saxony highly dependent on the company. 
As in other German industries, the close association of each German automobile 
m anufacturer with its home state sometimes includes state ownership in the company, 
altho ugh m ost often this is not the case. Substantial state ownerslup occurs in about 10% of 
German companies throughout all sectors, as compared to 25% of French firms and 1 % of 
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u.K. firms, as of 1993. (Whittington and Mayer, 104) State ownership of firms in Germany, 
w hen it occurs, is also m ore plural. "Reflecting Germany's federal nature, state share holdings 
are found at various levels-federal, regional, ... and even municipal .... Among the regional 
states, the most notable participation is probably Lower Saxony's in VW ... at about 20%" 
(Whittington and Mayer, 104-5) Even when there is no direct state ownership in a 
particular company, the German government and the regional state governments in which 
manufacturers are based take a corporatist, protective attitude toward the politically powelful 
and irnportant German automobile companies. 
The history of each of the major German autolllobile manufacturers, their 
relationship to their regional states, as well as their place within the German auto industry 
as a whole, provide case examples of the blending of corporate-state interests and of the 
challenges facing the German auto industry and German economy as a whole. This analysis 
will focus on Volkswagen, Porsche and DaimlerChrysler in particular. 
VOLKSWAGEN 
T he Gennan government founded Volkswagen (VW) as a state owned company in 
1937. Volkswagen (meaning "people's car") was found ed with a social agenda. The original 
purpose of the company was to increase employment by employ ing the vast number of 
workers needed to produce an affordable car on a grand scale. Ferdinand Porsche designed 
the o riginal Volkswagen car, the famous Beetle, at Adolf Hitler's request. The Beetle was 
designed to become the German M odel T. At that time, an average American worker could 
afford a car, thanks to the economies of scale introduced by Ford and General M otors. In 
contrast, the average German worker in 1937 could not afiord a car. VW has continued to 
follow the business model of a volume, mass-market producer, but has evolved from a single 
product company (the Beetle) to a volume manufacturer that offers a broad range of 
products covering wide sections of the market. In the 1980s and 1990s, VW shifted further 
in the direction of increasing the scope (product range) of its production through the 
acquisition of the Spanish company, SEAT, and the Czech company, Skoda.VW has further 
expanded into the prem.ium car m arket, primarily through its Audi subsidiary, but also with 
the acquisition of ultra luxury nameplates such as Bentley and Bugatti. (Dankbaar, 1) VW is, 
therefore, increasingly trying to satisfy all things automotive to all segm ents of the market. 
Volkswagen was privatized in the early 1960s. T he descendents of Ferdinand Porsche, 
indud.ing his grandson Ferd.inand Piech, own shares in Volkswagen, as well having control 
of Porsche through its supervisory board. (Brecht and M ayer, 30; Dankbaar, 2) VW and 
Porsche have had many links throughout the history of the two companies. Ferdinand Piech 
was the chief executive ofVW from 1993 until 2002.When VW was priva tized in the 1960s, 
the German government passed a law aimed at recognizing and perpetuating the social 
importance ofVulkswagen to its native state of Lower Saxony by establishing an institutional 
corpo rate safety valve to prevent a foreign or hostile takeover that might otherwise result in 
the loss of thousands of jobs in Wolfsburg. This law allowed Lower Saxony to own a 
controlling 20% stake in the company and prevented other shareholders from acquiring 
m ore than this 20% stake of voting shares . TIllS 1960 law (known as the "Volkswagen law") 
preserved a state interest in VW that effectively prevented a hostile takeover, until Ferdinand 
Piech launched a bid by Porsche to take a controlling interest in VW in September 2005. 
T his takeover bid created a protracted power struggle with Porsche acting in apparent 
defi ance of the VW law. The Porsche takeover ofVW has just recently come to fruition , as 
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of March 2007, and hinged on the likelihood that the E .U. court would strike down the 
German Volkswagen law. The Porsche bid for VW highlighted the anti-takeover VW law. 
Tlus law had already become a focus of conflict between Germany and the E.U., since the 
law is in apparent conflict with the E. U. directive o n corporate takeovers.3 This and other 
conflicts between German automobile industry interests and the E.U . will be discussed in 
greater detail below, after considering the situation of other German autom obile 
manufacturers as well , beginning with Porsche. 
PORSCHE 
Porsche is a niche automobile manuElcturer and is much smaller than the other 
German car compalues. H owever, Porsche is highl y profitable. In fac t, Porsche produces the 
highest profit margins o n its sales in the entire global auto industry, even though all its cars 
are produced in Germany, with high German manufacturing costs. (Becker, 10) Ferdinand 
Porsche founded the cornpany in the 1930s and all the voting shares in the company are still 
controlled by approximately 50 of his heirs (from the Porsche and Piech families). These 
fanuly m embers retain total control of the company through a signed voting pact and 
corporate governance rules that allow them control despite the fac t that their 100% 
ownership of Porsche's voting shares represents only about 10% of the company's capital. It 
is estimated that the Porsche heirs together own an additional 10% of non-voting stock as 
well. (Brecht and M ayer, 30) T lus fanuly control of Porsche precludes the possibility of 
hostile takeovers, with the Porsche and Piech families firmly in control of the company's 
supervisory board and its destiny. Porsche's business plan, at least until recently, has been to 
remain a niche player in the auto market; but it is not a sm all company. Porsche has 
approximately 8,000 employees and had total earnings in the year 2005-2006 of 2.1 1 billion 
Euros, despite sales of just 96,794 cars, wluch nevertheless represented a sales volume 
record .4 
Although Porsche is based in Stuttgart, in the state of Baden-Wi.irttemburg, Porsche 
has longstanding close ties to vw, which has particularly helped Porsche over the years . 
Porsche used VW parts in its first cars. Most recently, Po rsche was able to develop its luxury 
SUV, the Cayenne, with only a m odest investment because of a partnership that it formed 
with VW to share the platfonn used for the VW Touareg. This agreem ent helped Porsche 
expand beyond its limited sports car line and reap high profits from a vehicle that it could 
not have profitably developed on its own.s Po rsche, therefore, has much to gain by 
increasing its access to VW model platforms and electrorucs, which are costly to develop. 
The operant Porsche business plan of remaining a boutique auto m aker and out-sourcing 
much of its product development and productio n has been exposed as unsustainable by 
Porsche management's desire to forge closer ties with vw. Analysts have said that Porsche's 
VW takeover bid stemmed from the fear of a possible link- up between VW and 
DaimlerChrysler that would have j eopardized Porsche's historic partnership with VW.6 
BMW 
BMW (Bavarian Motor Works) is another regional automotive powerhouse. BMW 
was founded in 1916 in Munich, Bavaria. The corporate practices at BMW emulate the 
traditional, somewhat isolationist values of Bavaria , as demonstrated by BMW's rather closed 
corporate culture. (Dankbaar, 1) The Quandt fanlily controls BMW, as well as several other 
major companies . BMW's business 1110del has traditionally focused on the prenuu111 or high-
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end market as a specialist producer rather than a volume producer. More recently, however, 
BMW has hedged its bets with a limited expansion into the nuss-market segment with the 
Mini Cooper car and the lower end BMW 1 series. BMW has also pursued an extension of 
its high-end market into the ultra luxury field with the acquisition of the Rolls-Royce 
brand. 
OPEL AND FORD WERKE 
Opel and Ford Werke are American owned subsidiaries of General Motors and Ford , 
respectively. T hese Gennan subsidiaries of the two big American auto companies 
nevertheless hold a significant place in the German auto industry. Opel is headquartered in 
Frankfi.Irt in the region of H essen. Ford's European headquarters and production facilities 
are in Koln in Northrhine-Westfal.ia. Opel is an old German company dating from the 
1860s that was bought by General Motors in 1929. Europeans consider Opel a German car 
and the region Jnd its workers generally look upon Opel as a GermJn company. 
Nevertheless, Opel is controlled from the American headquarters of General M otors. Ford 
founded Ford Werke in 1925 and it is perhaps even more tightly associated with its 
American founder. H owever, Ford Werke still represents a m aj or employer in Koln. 
(Dankbaar, 2) These companies are mass-market producers that have been criticized as too 
focus ed on the American emphasis on productivity and cost cutting rather than the typical 
German automobile manufacturer's focus on engineering, product innovation and quality. 
The reputation of the German auto industry for engineering has often allowed German 
manufacturers to obtain a premium for their cars that has historically helped them to 
overcome the disadvantage of high cost production in Germany. The different business 
cultures at Opel and Ford, as compared with the other German manufacturers, is refl ected 
in. less innovative product lines and a lower consumer image that has required Opel and Ford 
Werke to compete more on price against the other European mass market manufacturers, 
and has resulted in lower profit margins or losses. A comparison between the net returns on 
2004 sales between Opel, which had a net loss on sales of minus 4%, and the world auto 
industry leading net sales returns of Porsche at plus 17%, illustrates the potential difference 
in added value afforded by image, although these two m anufacturers occupy very different 
market niches. (Becker, 4 and 10) 
DAIMLERCHRYSLER AND EXPANDING SCOPE AND COMPETITION IN THE AUTO INDUSTRY 
DaimlerChrysler was created in 1998 as the result of a merger between the German 
company Daimler-Benz, which produces the Mercedes-Benz luxury brand, and the U.s. 
mass-market manufacturer, C hrysler, with the German managers in control of the new 
company. The German corporate culture of DaimlerC hrysler reflects the relative social and 
political conservatism of its home state of Baden-Wi.irttemburg, where its headquarter ci ty 
of Stuttgart is located. (Dankbaar, 1) The m erger with C hrysler reflected an extension of 
Daimler-Benz down m arket that had already been started with the development of its Smart 
Car subsidiary in the late 1990s and the expansion of the Mercedes-Benz line to include 
the relatively inexpensive Mercedes A-class. 
This product expansion reflects the competitive picture in the German auto industry 
in which the high-end manufacturers, such as Mercedes-Benz and BMW, try to poach sales 
and generate growth in the middle and lower segments of the nurket at the expense of the 
historic mass-market producers. At the sam e time, as we have noted , VW and other mass 
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producers try to m ove into the high end of the market for growth and higher profit m argins . 
D aim..lerChrysler has also followed BMW's and VW's expansions into the ultra-luxury 
m arket. BMW and VW acquired the Rolls R oyce and Bentley brands, respectively. 
D aimlerC hrysler responded by developing its own new M aybach ultra- luxury brand . This 
situation of ever expanding m odel ranges is occurring world wide in an auto industry 
replete with over capacity and stagnant real growth. 
T he efforts of relative niche pbyers like Merecedes-Benz and B MW to extend their 
m arket into the lower range, and the efforts of the mass-producers, such as VW, to expand 
into the upper m arket segm ent, have not addressed the industry's problem of over capacity. 
Instead, each m anufacturer that has followed this route fa ces the increased cost of 
m aintaining greater model diversity with lower than planned profit margins resulting from 
a glut of new m odels across all m arket segm ents that has led to increased price competition 
in each price range. Becker has referred to this situation as an "oligopolistic destructive 
competition. As the market as a w hole is no longer growing, every producer is trying to 
generate growth at the cost of the other competitors .. .. the result in the end is that none 
can be the lucky winner; to a greater or lesser degree they are all losers with stagnant market 
volumes and shrinking profit margins." (Becker, 11 ) Maynard and Bunkley quoted a veteran 
auto industry amlyst, j ohn A. Casesa , in the N cUJ Y(,,·k Timcs as saying that, "This industry is 
ripe for further consolidation because the most profitable markets have matured; they 're not 
growing anym ore. T hese are classic conditions for consolidation."7 
THE RISKS OF MERGING WITH A NON-GERMAN PARTNER 
Although consolidation can clea rly be a method to reduce overcapacity in the auto 
industry, this was not Daimler-Benz's intent when they m erged with Chrysler in 1998. 
Instead, they sought market expansion and a possible increase in effi ciency through 
economies of scale. H owever, Daintier inherited an aging and relatively weak product line 
in the acquired C hrysler brands and was faced with the investment and engineering 
challenge of coming up with competitive models for the four Chrysler brands, one of which 
they eliminated (Plymo uth) . The Daimler-Benz strategy of acquiring an expanded world 
lnarket share through its m erger with C hrysler is now seen as an apparent failure. 
Furthermore, the merger that resulted in DaimlerC hrysler led to a relatively wide 
distribution of corporate ownership, as compared to the narrow distribution of ownership 
and control typical of German companies, particularly in the German auto industry 
(excluding the American controlled companies of Opel and Ford). The D aintler-
Benz/ C hrysler m erger resulted in Americans holding 10% of the shares in the resulting 
DaimlerC hrysler Corporation. (Dankbaar, 1) T his brings into play an American shareholder 
expectation of m aximizing share value. 
SHAREHOLDERS VS. STAKEHOLDERS 
American shareholder interest in maximizing share price over the short term is at 
odds with the traditional German mentality of shareholders as company stakeholders. 
German company shareholders and voting blocks are not widely distributed among 
financial and other private institutions, mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, 
and individuals, as compared to the broad distribution of company stocks held by these 
fa ctions in America (or in the u.K.). (Becht and Mayer, 29) Instead , German board and 
shareholder voting blocks are m ore tightly held and include trade unions and banks with a 
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stake in the company, in addition to the holdings of founding families, other German 
companies, and, in some cases, the state. These German shareholders have a long-term stake 
in the companies that they hold and are typically categorized as risk adverse, interested in 
the long-term stability of the corporation, and are concerned with the social implications 
of risky organizational change. (Luo. 38) 
THE RISKS Of SHAREHOLDERS: THE DAIMLERCHRVSLER EXAMPLE 
The German auto companies have only Illediocre market capitalization levels, 
especially in comparison with Toyota, the world's most valuable carmaker with a market 
capitalization of 239 billion dollars.S This reflects the fact that, overall, Germany lacks a 
shareholder culture, with a market capitalization of only 30% of its GDp, compared to 122% 
in the U.S. and 152% in the u.K. Typically, individuals and institutional investors own few 
shares of German public corporations. (Luo, 42) If the present major stakeholders in the 
German auto companies lose control over their tightly held shares and limited voting 
blocks, "Acquisitions by outsiders could put Germany's automobile industry in the same 
position as Britain's. where every notable name has been sold to foreign owners."9 
The vulnerability of DaimlerChrysler to such a takeover is perceived as having 
increased as the result of its swallowing of Chrysler and the resulting depreciation and 
dilution of its stock. This caIne to a head in February 2007 when the Chrysler division of 
DaiInlerChysler reported that it had lost 1.48 billion dollars . Dieter Zetsche, 
D<\imlerChrysler's chief executive, announced that "all options are on the table" in regard to 
a sale of the Chrysler division. 10 Zetsche has cited his desire to n1.aintain control of the 
German parent company, Daintier, as his reason for proposing to divest Daintier of the 
Chrysler division by seeking suitors for Chrysler. 11 Since this announcement, 
DaimlerChrysler has had negotiations with a number of potential suitors for Chrysler, 
including private equity firms who "would most likely impose plant closings and layoffs to 
turn around Chrysler for a quick resale." 12 This potential "doomsday" scenario for Chrysler, 
in which it is bought by a private equity firm and cannibalized to turn a quick profit, 
represents a prescient warning for German Daintier itself. Adam Jonas, an analyst of the 
European auto industry for Morgan Stanley in London, was quoted in the NeU' York Times 
as saying, "Should the sale [of Chrysler] fail to take place, DaimlerChrysler shares will 
probably fall once more, leaving the company even more vulnerable. If Zetsche doesn't get 
this right ... the door will be open to interlopers." 13 
BACK TO THE FUTURE fOR DAIMLER? 
After the potential sale of Chrysler, DaimlerChrysler shareholders have advocated a 
return to the "old days," with the resurrection of the Daimler-Benz name and a renewed 
emphasis on the Mercedes luxury brand14 Presumably, this restructuring would allow a 
return to the previous concentration of shareholders who hold a stake in the company and 
a typical German corporate concentration of voting blocks that could fend off hostile 
takeovers in the future. Tllis potential effort by DaimlerChrysler to divest itself of its 
American corporate division is an effort to reassert its German roots and return to the 
typical protectionist German corporate influences of the past. 
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DAIMLER-BENZ: THE ROLE OF BANKS IN GERMAN CORPORATIONS 
Prior to its merger with Chrysler, Daimler-Benz represented a classic example of 
German corporate structure. Corporate government at the former Daimler-Benz, like most 
Gennan corporations, was "characterized by a lesser reliance on capital markets and outside 
investors and a stronger reliance on large inside investors and finan cial institutions to achieve 
efilciency ... " (Luo, 42) Instead of market and outside investors, Germans firms receive strong 
investment from banks tlut are influential in the design and fun ctioning of the companies 
themselves. This is a result of the tact that the banks themselves sit on the boards and 
commissions of the companies. Ernst-Jiirgen Horn, in his evaluation of industrial policy in 
M'I/laging Illdustrial Change in J,#stcrn Europe, reports that the "banking system is said to have 
an extraordinarily intimate relationship with the big industrial groups .... Excessive 
economic power. ... allows the banks to act as brokers, investlnent analysts, dealers and much 
else besides." (55) Horn then goes on to list three major factors in bank control: "(i) 
Participation of banks in non bank corporations. (ii) The Depotstimmrecht, that is the 
proxy votes by banks on behalf of shares deposi ted with them by clients. (iii) The 
representation of banks on the supervisory boards of non bank operations." (55). Horn sites 
statistics that show how imbedded banks are in firms. For example, in the annual meeting 
of sixteen corporations, the bank-owned shares came to over 25 percent of shares 
represented in corporations. Banks also control proxy votes and represented through proxies 
over 25 percent of the votes in 41 corporations, and over 50 percent in thirty. This means 
that through proxies alone, not including bank owned shares, banks could vote on 10 
percent of the shares in fifty cases, going as high as 25 percent in twenty-nine cases. (56) 
In "Anatomy of a Governance Transformation: The Case of Daimler-Benz," Denis 
Logue and James K. Seward reported that in the late 1980's banks were the top 5 
shareholders in the Daimler-Benz company, controlling 78.39 percent of the voting stock. 
(90) The structure of Daimler-Benz was a prime example of the typical German 
corporation. Deutsche Bank in particular has had deep and historic ties to Daimler-Benz, 
with links to both of its parent companies, Daintier and Benz. Deutsche Bank was heavily 
involved in the merger of these two firms in 1926 and supplied the chairmanship of the 
newly merged company over its first decade. (Whittington and Myer, 97) Deutsche Bank's 
investment in Daimler-Benz in 1993 consisted of roughly 28 percent of the company's 
stock. As Logue and Seward explain, Deutsche Bank exerted incredible power in managing 
the company. Tllis has to do with the typical German corporate structure of the company. 
"Large German companies have two governing boards: the supervisory board and the 
management board. The supervisory board is composed of directors and representatives of 
various labor groups; including 'white collar' employees ... The supervisory board of 
Daimler-Benz has twenty members. The chairman of Daimler-Benz's supervisory board, 
Hilmar Kopper, also happens to be the chairman of Deutsch e Bank's management board." 
(Logue and Seward, 90) The supervisory board's task is to appoint the management board 
and to approve major corporate decisions. Much of this is left up to banks. 
As Logue and Seward also point out, "This bank dominance effectively means that 
under the traditional system of corporate governance in Germany, external capital markets 
exert little discipline." (91) The proponents of this German system of stakeholder corporate 
governance, as opposed to shareholder corporate culture, argue that large shareholders like 
the banks share strategic motivations with the operational managers to advance the 
company 's business rather than a motivation to merely maxinlize the value of a company's 
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shares. According to Sigurt Vitols, "Large German banks have tended to view their 
shareholdings as a mechanism for protecting their loans and strengthening their business 
relationships with companies rather than as a direct source of income." (Vitols, 342) Horn 
concludes, " It is hard to assess how far the close relationship between the banks and the big 
corporJtions contributes to overall industrial performance. It has been argued that the banks 
are well equipped to provide strategic advice and that, wanting good returns, they are vitally 
concerned with the efficiency of their clients." (56). 
THE PRESSURES OF GLOBALIZATION ON GERMAN CORPORATE STRUCTURE 
The argument agJinst the German stake holding system fits into the general views on 
globalization, which are increasingly being promoted by the European Union. The E.u. 
seeks to promote actions that are in the interest of international competitiveness (as opposed 
to the potentially more myopic interests of corporate stakeholders) and in the interest of 
developing a single capital market. The E. U. policies, therefore, tend to encour;]ge corporate 
restructuring in "stakeholder countries" such as Germany. These policies are designed to 
Clcilitate takeover bids when such bids are in the interests of a company's general 
shareholders, as opposed to the interests of only its stakeholders. This E. U. policy ofhreaking 
down the protectionist barriers to takeovers has been contentious, as can be seen in the close 
votes in the European Parliament on provisions in the E.U. law (directive) concerning 
takeovers. For example, in July 2001 , 273 representatives voted for and 273 voted against a 
proposed directive text, which defea ted that effort. IS To a large degree, the E.u. efiorts have 
been "incremental-rather than fundamental" in advancing changes in ownership, employee 
representation, and management institutions. (Vitols, 339) Proponents of these changes 
argue that, "since international capital markets are increasingly dominated by diversified 
portfolio investors (such as mutual funds and pension funds) seeking higher returns, 
c~mpanies must adopt the shareholder model or be starved of the external capital needed 
to invest and survive." (Vitols, 338) According to this argument, obtaining access to capital 
markets will ultimately drive corporations away from the non-market driven features of the 
stakeholder model in order to achieve greater competitiveness. 
The DaimlerChrysler merger took Daimler-Benz at least incrementally in the 
direction of market forces and incrementally away from its stakeholder foundations. 
DaimlerChrysler was incorporated under German law as a German stock corporation (A G) 
and retains a two-tiered German system of corporate governance with a supervisory board 
of major shareholder and employee representatives and a separate management board, all in 
keeping with the German stakeholder system. However, shares of DaimlerChrysler are 
widely held and company shares are traded on both the NYSE and the FrJnkfurt Stock 
Exchange, and at other locations around the world, with the necessary transparency in 
financial reporting. Americans are estimated to hold 10% or more of the stock. (Dankbaar,1) 
Although Deutsche Bank remains the largest single shareholder, the bank's holding were 
diluted from 28% to 12% by the merger. (Whittington and Mayer, 97) When the going 
recently got rough, with Chrysler division losing 1.48 billion dollars and the world 
automotive industry ripe for further consolidation, even this incremental move by Daintier 
toward market/ shareholder forces, and the resulting dilution of the stakeholder system at 
Daintier, has been enough for DaimlerChrysler CEO Dieter Zetsche to adapt a cut and run 
policy toward Chrysler. By divesting the Chrysler division and the American shareholder 
pressures that came along with the Chrysler acquisition, Zetsche hopes to avoid putting the 
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core G erman company in play for a takeover, with a little help from stakeholder promoting 
Gennan laws and German corporate governance institutions. 
TAKEOVER FROM THE INSIDE: PORSCHE AND VW 
DaimlerChrysler 's takeover fears did not arise in a vacuum. D airnlerChrysler has been 
the observer ofPorsche 's partially hostile takeover of the much largerVW Corporation over 
the last 18 months. T his takeover raises still other concerns relating to corporate 
globalization-type reforms and E . U. policy, as well as potential conflict of interest concerns 
relating to cross investment in German companies, even by competitors in the same 
industry. It also points to a fl aw in the German system of concentrated corporate ownership 
and control, which may allow an inside player to wrestle control of a company if German 
restraints against takeovers are relaxed. The Porsche takeover ofVW shows that, at least in 
the short term, German firms m ay have to be more concerned about takeovers from with.in 
their boarders than from outside. The stereotypical xenophobic nature of the German 
psyche nuy care less about this threa t, but such inside takeovers are not necessarily in the 
general shareholders interest, or even in the interest of a particular corporation such as VW. 
Although Porsche has historic engineering and product ties to Vw, these ties have 
seem.ingly benefited the sm aller Porsche Company to a greater degree. It is unlikely that 
Po rsche would have been able to manufacture automobiles without access to VW parts from 
its very beginning. As auto makers look to expand the scope of their lines into new models 
in order to compete, the sm all European niche players other than Porsche have all been 
absorbed by larger firms. T he writing is on the wall, even though Porsche remains highly 
profitable in the present. As we have seen , Porsche's present profitability was aided by the 
highly advantageous deal that Porsche was able to make with VW to give it access to the 
To uareg SUV platform for its Cayenne version luxury SUVThis platform was developed at 
a to tal estimated cost of 1.2 to 1.8 billion dollars. Porsche invested only 420 million dollars, 
which is "very, very little for a new car," according to Ferdinand Dudenhoffer, director of 
the German C enter for Autom otive Research at the University of Gelsenkirchen. "There is 
no question, VW had all the risks and Porsche earned the greatest profits," according to 
Dudenhoffer. 16 VW also does most of the manufacturing of the Cayenne for Porsche at its 
factory in Bratislava, were the cost of m.anufacturing is lower than at existing Porsche plants 
in Germany. If Porsche's interests are allowed to dictate future developments, VW's own 
brands may suffer in Porsche's interest, as the wide range of brands and models that VW 
owns nuy potentially, if no t already, compete with Porsche, particularly Audi. This conflict 
has, in fact, already been dem onstrated in the Cayenne/ Touareg deal.This deal went through 
well before the present Porsche takeover effort , but it still likely reflects the strong position 
of Piech and other Porsche representatives on the VW advisory board, even before the 
takeover. Audi insiders complain that the VW I Porsche cooperation on the Cayenne delayed 
the introduction of the Audi Q7 luxury SUV by 3 years. Tlus car has only just recently come 
to market, well after the Cayenne, likely costing Audi m arket share and profit. Other VW 
brands besides Audi m ay also stand in the way of Porsche's current or potential market 
niche, particularly Bugatti and Lamborgini . Will the fate of these brands be deternuned by 
VW's best interest or in the best interest ofPorsche?17 
CROSS OWNERSHIP OF CORPORATE SHARES: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
These market concerns are not simply details of the German auto market; they arise 
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from a potential conflict of interest inherent in the German corporate governance structure 
that allows cross ownership in a competitor's company. This conflict of interest is potentially 
magnified by the concentrated ownership of controlling shares in German companies and 
it is spotlighted by Porsche's bid for VW In the case ofVW, the VW law served to counter 
the possibility that the owner of another company in the same industry could amass a 
controlling stake that would allow him to influence management to act against the interests 
of the company, and therefore against the interest of Lower Saxony. Tllis law guaranteed 
Lower Saxony the single largest voting block of shares, which no other single owner could 
exceed. Even so, Ferdinand Piech, who with his family controls 100% of the voting shares 
of Porsche, was likely able to influence VW in the interests of Porsche even before he 
attempted his takeover ofVW. Piech's pre-existing power on the VW supervisory board 
certainly helped llim to launch and pull off Porsche's takeover ofVW from the inside. 
In the future, globalization and an accompanying shareholder culture may apply 
pressure for reforms to the German corporate culture that allows for concentrated cross 
ownership of stock in a competitor, such as the shares and influence exercised by Porsche 
in VW Such influence is potentially counter to the interests of a free market and to the 
interests of company's general shareholders if the competitor gains undue influence in the 
company, as may have happened in the case ofPorsche and its influence on vw. Even before 
the Porsche/ VW takeover bid there had already been some pressure to change the German 
corporate practice of allowing a retired former CEO to assume the company 's board 
chairmanship, where he may appoint his successor and maintain undue influence. (Luo, 43) 
This practice was still in place at VW and it is one of the German corporate practices that 
Piech exploited in his takeover ofVW. Piech holds the strong position of C hairman ofVW's 
supervisory board because he was the recently retired CEO ofVW Piech 's power was also 
magnified because he already controlled a large number of voting shares through the 
holdings of Porsche and his family in VW Porsche AG already held two seats on the VW 
supervisory board, in addition to Piech's own seat, even before the takeover attempt was 
launched. At the start of the Porsche and Piech takeover bid, " Investors, analysts, and 
members of the VW supervisory board [cried] foul over Piech's conflict of interest, since he 
juggles ownership in Porsche with his role as VW chairman." 18 
THE PALACE Coup: HEADS ROLL 
Christian Wulff, the premier of Lower Saxony who sits on the VW board representing 
the state of Lower Saxony, initially attempted to block Piech 's takeover by proposing that 
both Piech and the other Porsche managers who sit on the VW board be removed. He 
supported this proposal by citing the German corporate governance code that reconunends 
(hut does not demand) that a chairman step down if he holds a position with a conl.petitor. 
19 This did not happen. The CEO ofVw, Bernd Pischetsrieder, sided with Wulff. Piech and 
his collaborators on the VW board removed Pischetsrieder in November 2006.20 Piech 
stayed on, increasing Porsche's shares in VW and demanding an additional Porsche seat on 
the supervisory board. When Pischetsrieder was forced out as CEO, Volkswagen's No.2 
executive, Wolfgang Bernhard, also resigned. Bernhard had been brought to VW from 
Chrysler to pursue a stringent cost-cutting program at VW to help better position VW as a 
competitive mass-market producer. With the removal of these two executives and the 
appointment of Martin Winterkorn, a Piech protege, Piech consolidated his hold on VW 
and reasserted VW's old priorities from his tenure as CEO at vw. Since these management 
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changes,VW has shifted its emphasis from cost-cutting back to high-quality engineering and 
design, in line with the market strategy advocated by Mr. Piech, who trained as an 
automotive engineer.21 Only the VW law could conceivably stand in the way of Piech's and 
Porsche's takeover ofVW, a takeover which reassembles the parts of Piech's grandfather's 
automotive legacy into one empire. 
THE E.U.'s UPHILL BATTLE TO FACILITATE TAKEOVERS 
Piech's takeover bid was always dependent on the E.U striking down the German VW 
law. Piech had reason to believe that the E.U would comply with his wishes. The E.U 
Parliament has long recognized that a directive on a common framework for cross-boarder 
takeover bids is essential. Under increasing conditions of globalization, such transactions "can 
contribute to the development and reorganization of European firms, a key condition for 
withstanding international competition and developing a single capital market. That said, 
[takeovers] are still subject to very divergent national rules [that] give rise to numerous 
problems ... " (COM (2002) 534 final, page 3) 
The contentiousness of this takeover issue can be seen in the E.Ulegislative history 
involving the framing of a directive on takeover bids. The E.U. first began work on a 
directive to approximate E .U member state's laws that govern takeover bids in 1985. By 
1990, the E.U Commission had devised the text of a directive aimed at " harmonizing" the 
field of takeover bids in Europe. This proposal encountered strong opposition from certain 
member states and required revision. (COM (2002) 534 final, page, 2) By 1997, however, 
the Commission adapted an amended proposal and by 2000 the Council unanimously 
adopted this position. Controversies on certain issues persisted and amendments were 
proposed. The tie vote in the European Parliament on a compromise text, mentioned above, 
led to the defeat of the text in July 2001. This defeat centered on three controversial political 
considerations that reflect Europe's ambivalence on takeovers. The first political 
consideration was a rejection of the stipulation that the board of a company facing a 
takeover must obtain approval from shareholders before it can take defensive measures 
against a bid. The second political consideration was the perception that the E.U. takeover 
directive provided insufficient protection to the employees of companies facing a takeover. 
The third political concern was that the proposal still failed to achieve a level playing field 
with the United States. (COM (2002) 534 final, page 2) Despite the existence of an E.U 
law to facilitate takeovers, political divisions such as these have continued to hamstring the 
E.U's efforts. 
In 2002, the European Conunission proposed new rules to address outstanding 
concerns on the takeover directive. This new revision contained articles that had specific 
implications against the survival of the German VW law, or similar measures. Specifically, 
Article 11 of these provisions stipulates that restrictions on the transfer of securities, such as 
the imposition of a ceiling on shareholding or restrictions on voting rights, "are rendered 
unenforceable against the ofieror or cease to have effect once a bid has been made public 
(Article 11)." (COM (2002) 534 final, page 4) These provisions, and other provisions 
designed to prevent both pre-bid and post-bid defenses to takeovers, were adapted in the 
Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of21 April 2004 on 
takeover bids. However, last minute negotiations at the time, resulting from strong resistance 
on the part of several countries, including Germany, heavily watered down this E.U 
takeover directive. These negotiations resulted in an amendment that allows countries to 
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opt-out of certain key provisions of the directive. This amendment also exempts companies 
from the rules if the bidder is not subject to the same obligations. 22 A recent review by the 
Commission of the European Conm1Unities on the implem entation of the Directive on 
Takeover bids, released on February 21,2007, found that a majority of states exploited these 
loopholes in a protectionist fashion , which m ay have resulted in new obstacles to takeovers. 
(SEC(2007)268, page 10) This report no tes that Gerlllany is one of many countries that 
allow its companies to opt out of the two key provisions in the takeover directive, including 
the ilnpo rtant Article 11 (breakthrough rule) as well as Article 9 (the board neutrality rule). 
(SEC(2007)268, page 12) For the time being, the German VW law remains on the books. 
THE E.U. MOVES TO STRIKE DOWN THE VW LAW 
Although many countri es, including Germany, exploited the loophole of optional 
exemptions to block the E. U. directive o n takeovers, the E. U. nevertheless proceeded to take 
legal action against countries that refused to apply the fundamental rules. The German 
Volkswagen law soon came under scrutiny by the European Commission, which 
complained to Germany about the law in 2004 .23 The E. U. subsequently took Germany to 
court over this law in 2005. Porsche and Piech's takeover bid forVW has, therefore, assumed 
that this law would be struck down. A Porsche spokesman recently confirmed this 
assumption when he claimed " that the E uropean Court of Justice would confirm the 
invalidi ty of the VW law and so cause the German goverrunent to change or abolish tlus 
law."24 Porsche's assumption appears to have been correct. On February 13, 2007 , an 
advocate general on the European Court of Justice, Damaso Ruiz-Jarabo, reached a 
preliminary ruling stating that the VW law unreasonably prevented any intervention in the 
managem ent ofVW and was "not based on overriding reasons relating to public interest."25 
Although the advocate 's opinions are no t binding on E.U. judges, the court follows these 
opinions approximately 80% of the time. 26 Should the court ta il to strike down the VW law, 
or should Ge rmany try to circumvent the authority of the court (perhaps through appeals 
invoking the opt-out provisions of the directive), Porsche will " find itself holding a costly 
stake in the company witho ut being able to exercise more than 20% of the voting shares."27 
THE PORSCHE TAKEOVER OF VW: A FATE COMPUS 
Since this anno uncem ent by the European Court advocate general , Porsche expanded 
its holdings in VW to 31 % of the voting rights. T his acquisition exceeded the stipulated 
greater than 30% holding required to trigger a mandatory bid for the entire company. This 
stipulated m andatory bid for the entire company is the result of Article 5 of the E.U. 
takeover directive that sought to protect nunority shareholders and guarantee them an 
equitable price. However, tllis provisio n does not stipulate that the buyout offer be at a 
buyout induced prenuu111 share price, o r even at current market value, only that the offer 
be made at the stock's average value over a period of at least 6 months, to be deternuned by 
German law. (2004/25/EC: Article 5, section 4) Since Germany opted out of the directive 
rule that would have obliged the VW board to hold a general meeting of shareholders to 
vote to approve or block the bid, the general (non-voting) shareholders in VW have no 
power over the bid price offer other than that stipulated by the German implementation of 
Article 5 of the E . U. takeover directive. This meant that Porsche was able to make a below 
market offer to buy the rel1l.aining shares in the company. Porsche and Piech's inside 
influence allowed Porsche to gain control ofVW at a relative bargain price without paying 
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shareholders the typical premium that a takeover entails. M ajor VW shareholders are 
reportedly distressed at this result. 28 Since Porsche now already controls the company with 
31 % of the voting shares, it does not need the remaining company shares, most of which 
exert no influence on how the company is run. Porsche's below market bid for these shares 
is only a formality. Porsche is not likely to have to buy any shares at the offered price, which 
is well below the current market-trading price. This is fin e with Porsche, which does not 
plan to further increase its shares, according to a Porsche spokesman.29 Porsche and Piech, 
therefore, gained control ofVW "on the cheap," and the E. U. takeover directive stipulation 
(Article 5) designed to protect the share price for minority shareholders was inefiective in 
this case. 
Politically, Porsche has had to convince the Germans that it is a stable partner acting 
in the interests ofVW and of Germany, emphasizing that Porsche is not an outside (foreign) 
interloper. Porsche and Piech's public relations program in tlus vein seeks to paint Porsche 
as the savior ofVW, with Porsche acting to protect VW from the consequences of the E. U. 
court's impending decision to strike-down the VW law. Porsche's campaign insinuates that 
if Porsche does not gain control oNW, the elinunation of the VW law will result Volkswagen 
being acquired by an outside buyer who would insist on American style restructuring with 
the loss of thousands of jobs. Adam Jonas, the auto industry analyst at Morgan Stanley in 
London, interprets Porsche executives as saying, "Trust us, we're not trying to Hip this thing 
for value. This is a hundred year investment. Leave it with us, and we'll watch out for it."30 
CONCLUSION 
The German fear of takeovers in its auto industry is understandable given the vital 
importance of the auto industry to the German economy. The example of the British auto 
industry, in w luch every significant British-owned manufacturer succumbed to foreign 
takeover, is certainly prescient to the German auto industry and Governmant. The English 
car brands were often bought strictly for their marketing cache, to be resurrected in another 
country without any British ties or contribution to the British economy, as exemplified by 
a Chinese lTlanufacturer who now manufactures a Chinese sports car under the MG 
nameplate. Germany is not alone in its resistance to lift barriers to takeovers. The E.U.'s own 
recent conmllssion report (SE(2007)268) concluded that a large number of countries have 
failed to act to lift barriers against corporate takeovers through laws that would change 
protectionist corporate governance policies, as stipulated by the E.U. directive on corporate 
takeovers. Instead, there has been a strong trend for corporations and countries to use 
loopholes in the E.U takeover directive to find acceptable ways to block takeovers instead 
of facilitating them. This threatens to convert the existing E.U directive into a directive on 
allowed protectiOlust practices. 
Striking down the VW law only removes one solitary law among the numerous 
institutionalized German corporate protections. Ironically, the Germ.an VW law had already 
outlived its usefulness. The law stood in the way of market forces that pushed two German 
companies to effectively consolidJte into one holding. This consolidation of VW and 
Porsche serves the needs ofPorsche, one of the most profitable German auto manufacturers, 
and may perpetuate German ownership ofVW in the long haui. However, the E. 0. system 
of creating a single free market by directive, including facilitation of corporate takeovers, has 
been exposed as weak. Although German stakeholder corporate governance and GermJn 
corporatist state policies and regulations are at odds with the market integration efforts by 
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the E.U, German corporatist policies will not go away as long as they are useful and are 
perceived as strengthening German commerce. If market forces subsequently prove that 
these policies are detrimental to German corporate and state interests, as globalists predict, 
then the Germans will change these policies. If market forces do not prove German 
stakeholder protectionist policies to be detrimental, particularly given their longstanding 
proven stability benefits, then these policies will persist. 
The E.U. must let the market dictate, as E. U. directives will not dictate the market. 
The European Commission, in its report on the implementation of the Directive on 
Takeover Bids (SE(2007)268) has concluded as much when it announced that the E . U will 
take no immediate efforts to rewrite the directive to achieve better implementation of its 
objectives. Instead, the Commission plans to take "into account the potential negative effects 
of the new takeover rules on the European market. ... and try to analyze the reasons why 
Member States are so reluctant to endorse the fundamental rules of the Directive." 
(SE(2007)268) In other words, the COlnmission will continue to observe German (and 
other European) corporate systems, including the German auto industry, but it will 'leave 
welJ enough alone,' at least for now. 
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